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Abstract 
Latin America and the Caribbean have become in the last decade or so a formidable laboratory 
for the design and implementation of innovative social policies. In the face of an unprecedented 
surge in the number of non-contributory social assistance benefit programs in the region, there is 
a renewed interest - among policy makers and academics alike - as to whether such programs 
have "perverse" labor market effects, in particular discouraging participation and formal 
employment. After having revisited the theoretical arguments behind this concern, this paper 
reviews the existing quasi experimental empirical evidence for the region. Our reading of the 
evidence suggests that, consistent with zero income elasticity of leisure among the poor, social 
assistance has no large significant effects on participation and overall employment, other than 
possibly among the elderly. Some particular policies are, however, generating a substitution 
away from formal to informal employment. 
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Introduction 
Latin America and the Caribbean have become in the last decade or so a formidable 
laboratory for the design and implementation of innovative social policies. Compared to 
OECD countries, countries in the region have traditionally been characterized by low 
unemployment rates. However, not only are earnings and income inequality particularly high 
in the region, but roughly fifty percent of workers are informal, meaning that they do not 
contribute to social security in their job. As most countries in the region have adopted a 
Bismarkian system, whereby access to welfare and social insurance is conditional on 
participation in the formal labor market, the result is that these workers and their families are 
typically uninsured against a variety of risks, including the ones arising from poor health, 
employment loss or survival into old age, and they are at particular risk of falling into poverty. 
These high rates of informality are driven by high costs of employment - and possibly low 
returns - in the formal sector together with poor enforcement of labor laws.  
Widespread poverty and lack of access to insurance coverage among the more 
disadvantaged in LAC is of concern not only regarding equity but also efficiency. In the 
presence of credit constraints, poverty is likely to lead to suboptimal investment in the next 
generation’s human capital, while lack of insurance might push individuals into low-risk but 
low return activities, eventually dampening growth. 
In response to both the equity and efficiency issues arising from such unequal 
distribution of resources and access to risk-coping mechanisms, in the last ten to fifteen years 
policy makers across the region have engaged in major overhauls of the benefit and insurance 
systems. Pioneered in Chile in the 1980s and spurred by the success of Mexican Programa de 
Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) in the late 1990s, conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs) have rapidly expanded throughout the region. By making program receipt conditional 
on counterpart activities - typically investment in children’s health and schooling - these 
programs have relaxed poor households’ credit constraints while at the same time creating 
incentives for investment in the next generation’s human capital. Today, nineteen of the 
twenty-six countries in the region have some kind of CCT program in place (see Figure 1).1 
In addition, countries like Mexico and Colombia, where access to health care has traditionally 
1 These twenty-six countries in the region refer to the Inter-American Development Bank’s borrowing member 
countries. Exceptions include the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname, and Venezuela, of 
which Belize and Suriname are currently preparing CCT programs.	  
2 The reasoning behind this argument is that in an attempt to conceal informal workers firms will be deterred 
from growing, hampering innovation and productivity growth.	  
3 Although conditionalities are almost universal features of cash transfer programs in the region, some programs, 
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been contingent on formal employment, have started instituting parallel non-contributory 
health systems for millions of uninsured. Similarly, with various degrees of generosity and 
different targeting criteria, twelve countries in the region have by now some sort of non-
contributory pension system in place (see Figure 2). 
The results of these efforts have been staggering. CCTs have led to unprecedented 
falls in poverty rates and improvements in education, nutrition and health (for all, see 
Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). While Mexico is in the final stages of reaching universal health 
coverage (planned for 2013), non-contributory pensions in Bolivia, (rural) Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile have achieved coverage rates of between eighty-five and one hundred percent, 
drastically reducing old age poverty among the population with very low social security 
contribution rates. 
While these policies have led to major redistribution and possibly to efficiency gains, 
they have also sometimes led to undesirable fragmentation in the provision of social 
protection and, what some observers fear, negative efficiency consequences in terms of 
reduced labor supply and lower rates of labor market formalization. 
Indeed, simple economic reasoning suggests that subsidies to the poor tend to have 
negative labor supply effects via an income effect if, as typically assumed, leisure is a normal 
good. In addition, income means testing, which is typically used for the purpose of targeting, 
imposes an implicit tax on labor earnings. By reducing the price of leisure, this induces a 
substitution effect away from work, further reducing participation and leading to welfare 
losses. Contrary to a large body of research from more developed economies, in particular 
from the USA (see Moffitt, 2002, 2003 and Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz, 2011), 
convincing empirical evidence on the labor market effects of social assistance in scarce. For 
middle income countries, and in particular those in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is 
very little empirical evidence and for those that exist results are mixed. 
A related concern is that subsidies to the poor or the uninsured might create incentives 
for labor market informality, as individuals might prefer to hold unofficial unregistered jobs 
in order to escape taxation and access non-contributory social assistance (for all see Levy, 
2008).2 Again, despite the appeal of this argument, empirical evidence for the region is scarce 
and results are mixed.  
The aim of this paper is to take stock of the existing non-contributory social programs 
in the region and critically review the empirical evidence on their effects on labor market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The reasoning behind this argument is that in an attempt to conceal informal workers firms will be deterred 
from growing, hampering innovation and productivity growth.	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outcomes. To guide the discussion, a simple static model of labor supply with three sectors 
(inactivity, formal employment and informal employment) is presented which allows us to 
discuss the contemporaneous effects of non-contributory benefits on these different margins 
of participation.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the most important non- (and 
semi-) contributory social programs in the region. Section 2 presents a static labor supply 
model with three sectors. Section 3 reviews the existing empirical evidence on the effect of 
non-contributory policies on labor supply in the region. Section 4 finally concludes and offers 
some hints for future research.  
 
 
1. Non-contributory social programs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Recent years have seen governments in Latin America and the Caribbean launch social 
protection policies aimed at filling the gaps left by Bismarkian systems, which condition 
coverage against income and other shocks such as health, unemployment and old age survival, 
to social security contributions accumulated through formal employment.  
While social security system typically offer a bundle of benefits, recent non-
contributory programs that have emerged in the region offer unbundled benefits, typically 
focusing on one of the following specific objectives: relaxing households’ budget constraints 
and offering protection against income shocks, offering coverage against poor health or 
against low income in old age. These correspond to three major classes of programs: 
conditional cash transfers, health insurance and social pensions. Tables 1A, 1B and 1C 
provide a list of the major programs in force in the region as of 2011 in each of these 
categories. 
 
1.a Conditional Cash Transfers 
 
Cash transfers account for the majority of the recent surge in welfare transfers in the region 
(see Table 1A and Figure 1). These programs provide monetary transfers to poor households 
on the condition that they engage in some counterpart activities, typically investment in 
children’s human capital (for an excellent review of the existing programs, the economics 
behind them and their effects, see Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). Not only has the number of 
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CCT-like programs in the region over the last 15 years increased very rapidly, reaching 
twenty-five programs in nineteen countries by 2010, these programs have also increased in 
the number of beneficiaries and, in some countries, in the generosity of the transfer.  
The most popular type of program comprises a combination of education, health and 
nutrition objectives following Mexico’s Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación 
(PROGRESA), the first large-scale CCT in the region, which now covers 25% of the 
population after expanding to urban areas in 2002 and changing its name to Oportunidades 
(Barrientos, Nino-Zarazua and Maitrot, 2010). Among the most studied programs in the 
region are Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, Colombia’s Familias en Acción, Honduras’ Programa de 
Asignación Familiar, (or PRAF), Ecuador’s Bono de Desarollo Humano (or BDH), 
Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social, or (RDS), and Uruguay’s Plan de Atención Nacional a 
la Emergencia Social, or (PANES). 3  
CCTs simultaneously address current and long-term poverty. The first aim is achieved 
through the benefit component that relaxes the household budget constraint, increases living 
standards and possibly, via this, leads to greater investment in children’s human capital. 
Meanwhile, by conditioning benefits on children’s school attendance and health visits, these 
programs create direct incentives for parental investment in children’s human capital, in 
practice reducing the relative price of such investment.  
Conditionalities also feature in workfare programs, such as Argentina’s Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar, which offer assistance during periods of joblessness conditional on 
counterpart work activities. As conditionalities are costly, an additional rationale for their 
existence is that they provide ordeal mechanisms that make individuals with a sufficiently 
low opportunity cost of time (the truly unemployed or those with low labor earnings capacity) 
self-select into the program (see Besley and Coate 1992, who also suggest a deterrent 
rationale for the existence of these programs).  
Indeed, in low- and middle-income countries, targeting of social programs is 
complicated by the fact that potential beneficiaries tend not to appear in official (e.g. tax and 
social security) records, making it hard to ascertain their actual income level. Because of this, 
many cash transfer programs in the region identify beneficiaries via proxy-means testing 
and/or categorical targeting, although a few also condition participation on the recipient 
households’ actual level of income, as in the case of the Uruguayan PANES and Asignación 
Familiar programs (see Table 1A). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although conditionalities are almost universal features of cash transfer programs in the region, some programs, 
like PANES, are de facto unconditional (see Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011). 	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A related issue pertains to the conditions required to maintain eligibility and possibly 
graduate from these programs. Although in several of these programs eligibility depends 
specifically on age criteria or is limited to specific periods of time, some of these programs 
fail to embody very clear graduation or exit criteria (see Johanssen, Tejerina and Glassman, 
2008). In some instances, these criteria are contingent, depending on budgetary limits or 
political cycles. 
In closing, it must be emphasized that, while the mainstay of the programs listed in 
Table 1A is a cash transfer component, some of these include additional ingredients, for 
example in-kind transfers (as in the case of PANES, which also provided beneficiaries with a 
food card) and supply side interventions (as in the case of PROGRESA, which established 
schools and clinics in program villages). The existence of these additional components will 
need to be taken into account in predicting and assessing the impact of these programs on 
labor market outcomes. 
 
1.b Social Pensions 
 
A second form of welfare transfer programs that has recently expanded in the region is that of 
non-contributory pensions, which attempt to fill the coverage gaps left among the elderly who 
were once informal and are currently poor, as well as, sometimes, among very vulnerable 
populations (e.g. disabled). These policies, which are summarized in Table 1B and Figure 2, 
vary widely in terms of eligibility as well as generosity. Most policies select beneficiaries 
according to their income level - as in the case of Brazil’s Benefício de Prestação Continuada, 
or Chile’s Pensiones Solidarias, or make the transfer an inverse function of income, such as 
Bolivia’s Renta Dignidad that is universal in coverage but makes differentiated transfers to 
those with and without other sources of pension income. Because of the difficulties related to 
ascertaining beneficiaries’ true income level, these programs typically assess eligibility based 
on official income sources, such as pension and benefit income. In some cases, coverage is 
universal among specific subpopulations and targeting is categorical, such as in the case of 
Argentina’s Pensiones Asistenciales or Mexico’s 70 y más, which target all elderly 
individuals in given municipalities, or Brazil’s Previdência Rural, which is accessible to all 
rural workers with no contributory history. 
A related category of programs also presented in Table 1B subsidizes a minimum 
pension for workers who have not accumulated sufficient social security contributions to 
guarantee themselves the minimum legislated pension, as in the case of Chile’s Pensión 
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Mínima Garantizada por el Estado and Colombia’s Subsidio de Aporte a Pensión. 
 
1.c Non-contributory health insurance schemes 
 
Finally, a parallel but smaller scale development in the region has been the emergence of 
non-contributory health insurance schemes (see Table 1C). In addition to (rare) universal 
health care systems, such as that attempted for by Brazil’s Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), a 
few countries in the region have started offering health insurance to individuals and 
households uncovered by contributive regimes. Mexico’s Seguro Popular regime, for 
example, offers virtually free health insurance to everybody who is not a formal employee, i.e. 
affiliated with the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) or the Institute of Social 
Security and Services for Public Sector Workers (ISSSTE). Initiated in 2002, the program 
currently covers 95% of self-employed and informal salaried workers (Bosch and Campos-
Vázquez, 2010). Colombia’s 1993 health insurance reform institutionalized both a 
Contributive (CR) and a Subsidized Regime (SR). The former is mandatory for those 
employed with income above a certain threshold, regardless of occupation, whilst eligibility 
for the latter is determined by a poverty index score.4  
 
 
2. A model of labor supply with income tested subsidies and three 
sectors 
 
Having discussed the main features of the non-contributory benefits in the region, in this 
section we present a stylized static model of labor supply with three sectors: inactivity, 
formal employment and informal employment, that allows us to model the effect of non-
contributory benefits on these different margins of labor market participation. We are in 
particular interested in shedding light on the conditions under which non-contributory 
benefits can discourage participation in the formal labor market.  
To keep things simple, we assume that workers are price takers in the labor market 
and that both formal and informal labor contracts are at given hours H*, so there is no labor 
supply adjustment at the intensive margin. We also assume that T/2<H*≤T, where T is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In counter-tendency with respect to the rest of the region, Uruguay has recently reduced the incentives to labor 
market informality by extending the coverage of employer-provided health insurance to spouses and children of 
formal workers (see Bérgolo and Cruces, 2010).	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time endowment, so that workers cannot combine formal and informal work. We denote 
earnings in the formal sector net of social security contributions by WF and earnings in the 
informal sector by WI, while G is the amount of benefits.  
 
2.a Means-tested social assistance 
 
As said, most CCT programs in the region encompass some form of means testing. Similarly, 
most social pension programs condition program receipt on workers’ low levels of income. 
As earnings from informal employment typically escape taxation, it seems reasonable to 
assume that only formal earnings count for the purpose of income testing. We also assume, 
for simplicity and with loss of generality, that Y<K<Y+WF where Y is unearned income and K 
is the income eligibility threshold, meaning that we restrict our analysis to individuals with 
low income (Y<K) who are disqualified from social benefits if and only if they hold a formal 
employment (Y+WF>K). As subsidies are contingent on zero formal labor income, the model 
accounts not only for income tested social assistance but also for assistance that makes 
eligibility conditional on not being in formal employment (as, for example, in the case of the 
Mexican Seguro Popular).5 
Let DF (DI) be a dummy equal to one if the individual chooses the formal (informal) 
sector. We assume that individuals maximize the utility function, which depends on 
consumption (C) and the attributes of the sector of employment (S):  
 
Max U (C, S)  
 
St.  C=Y+WF DF +WI DI +G (1-DF), S=A (1-DF-DI) +B DF 
 
Where, A and B denote respectively the worker’s marginal valuation of the attributes of 
leisure and formal employment (relative to the attributes of informal sector jobs).6 
Figure 3 presents the equilibrium in the space a0b where we have set a=exp(A) and 
b=exp(B), and we have assumed, for tractability, a Stone-Geary utility function. The 
derivation is obtained in the Appendix. Informality arises in this model as some individuals 
have a relatively low valuation of formal benefits (B) coupled with a relatively low disutility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As a way to keep things simple, there is no uncertainly in the model. For simplicity, we also ignore the 
household dimension of labor supply.	  
6 The model can also be used to characterize the labor market equilibrium with no informality (as in welathier 
countries) by simply setting WI=0.	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of work (A). Individuals with high valuation of leisure (A) and low valuation of the attributes 
of formal employment (B) will chose inactivity. The residual share of the population will 
chose formal employment. 
Figure 4 presents the new equilibrium associated with a rise in the generosity of non-
contributory benefits, G. This leads to an unequivocal rise in inactivity and a fall in 
employment. This is the classical result induced by the combination of a negative income 
effect and the substitution effect induced by means testing (for all see Moffitt, 2002). The 
effect on informality though is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in G, by acting as a 
subsidy to informality, pushes individuals away from formal towards informal employment. 
On the other hand, among infra-marginal informal workers, the transfer has a pure income 
effect, reducing participation and pushing these workers into inactivity. While the share of 
formal workers in the population unequivocally falls, the share of informal workers in the 
population will either fall or rise, depending on the relative strength of the substitution and 
income effects. Equally ambiguous is the effect of the program on informality expressed as a 
fraction of the employed (as opposed to total) population.7 
 
3.b Zero income elasticity of leisure 
 
Only if the elasticity of leisure with respect to income is zero (and continuing to assume 
income testing), a sensible assumption of the poor population under study, does theory 
predict that informality will unequivocally rise both among the employed and the working 
age population. In this case, the increase in transfer generosity among infra-marginal informal 
workers will not create any incentive to increase leisure consumption and hence will not push 
these individuals into inactivity. The equilibrium for the model with zero income elasticity of 
leisure is also derived in the Appendix (using a linear utility function) and the comparative 
static is presented in Figure 5. 
 
2.c The role of income testing  
 
The model in the previous subsections is derived under the assumption that individuals are 
targeted based on their formal income or their formal labor status. It is precisely this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Interestingly, most empirical papers emphasize exclusively the substitution effect, concluding that social 
assistance will unambiguously lead to an increase in informality. 	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condition that induces a substitution effect away from formal employment into either 
inactivity or informal employment.  
As previously mentioned, some programs in the region, typically CCTs, use 
proxy-means testing as opposed to income testing. Other programs, typically social pensions, 
use categorical or even universal targeting. Even among the programs that use income testing 
to ascertain initial eligibility, re-assessment of these conditions is rare. In these cases - other 
than because of an income effect - one will not expect either informality or participation to be 
affected by social assistance.8  It is worth emphasizing that a rationale for categorical 
targeting/proxy means testing is precisely to avoid these distortions (may be at the cost of 
some mis-targeting). 
 
2.d The role of other program components and conditionalities 
 
A final caveat regards the variety of ingredients and possible counterpart activities associated 
with non-contributory programs in the region that might have independent effects on labor 
supply.  
An argument that is often heard (e.g. Alzua, Cruces and Ripani, 2010) is that by 
increasing households’ expenditure on school fees or other costs associated with children’s 
school attendance (transport costs, uniforms, books, etc.) for the purpose of fulfilling the 
conditionalities, CCTs might have limited effects on household disposable income and hence 
on the consumption of leisure. A similar concern is that, by increasing children’s school 
attendance, these programs might reduce their involvement in work and hence reduce 
household’s disposable income, with an ensuing rise in adults’ labor force participation. This 
effect is further reinforced if children’s and adults’ time are substitutes in the household’s 
production or utility function. 
Additional program ingredients, such as training programs or components that 
increase individuals’ health care utilization or improve health outcomes, could also possibly 
enhance employability and increase participation via increased productivity. Similar concerns 
arise when programs encompass community-level interventions, such as in the case of 
PROGRESA, which might have independent and additional effects on adult labor supply. In 
kind-transfers, which are sometimes associated with such programs, also have the potential to 
increase labor supply if work is a complement to the subsidized good (Skoufias, Unar and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Indeed, this can be easily verified by looking at the model (A2) in the appendix, assuming that consumption 
while in formal employment is WF+G+Y.	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González-Cossí, 2008). Finally, general equilibrium effects of the programs (such as changes 
in local market wages) might further mute the effect of non-contributory programs on adult 
labor supply. 
 
 
3. A review of the existing evidence 
 
In this section we present a review of the existing econometric studies on the impact of non-
contributory social assistance on labor supply. Particular attention will be paid to the potential 
role played by differences in the definitions of variables and reference populations, 
specificities of program design, assignment and evaluation strategies in order to highlight and 
understand the evidence. 
In the following, we review both studies that examine effects on employment, 
participation and, in some cases, hours worked, as well studies that focus on the choice 
between formal and informal employment. Although all these programs, and in particular 
CCTs, might affect children’s time use and labor supply (for all see the Edmonds, 2008), an 
investigation of these effects is beyond the scope of this review and in the following we 
restrict our analysis only to the effects on adult labor supply. 
 
3.a Effects on labor supply and hours of work  
 
A first set of studies analyzes the effect of conditional cash transfer programs on participation, 
employment and hours. These studies, which are summarized in Table 2A, cover five 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.  
A cursory analysis of the results in the table leads us to conclude that the estimated 
effects of social assistance on participation and hours of work are generally small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. When effects are statistically significant, these are 
not only small, but there is no clear pattern regarding their sign.  
One limitation of these studies is that, with the exception of Galasso and Ravallion’s 
(2004) study of Argentina’s workfare program Plan Jefes y Jefas, effects are identified based 
on difference-in-difference estimators that compare changes in work involvement across 
treatment and control communities before and after program implementation. One possible 
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concern is that program estimates are biased by omitted local variables that happen to be 
correlated with both program exposure and outcomes.  
In particular, this concern arises in relation to studies that exploit the gradual 
incorporation of communities in the program, such as Attanasio and Gómez’s (2004) study of 
the Colombian Familias en Acción and Foguel and Paes de Barros’ (2010) analysis of 
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia. Estimates that can and do rely on random assignment of communities 
to the treatment and control groups, like those of PROGRESA (Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani, 
2010, Parker and Skoufias, 2000, Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008), PAL (Skoufias, Unar and 
González-Cossío, 2008), PRAF (Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani, 2010) and RPS (Alzúa, Cruces 
and Ripani, 2010, Maluccio, 2007), are clearly more credible in this respect.9 
As in all these studies, assignment is at the community level. One question is whether 
positive general equilibrium effects or effects of community level interventions offset 
negative direct program effects on labor supply, explaining net small and insignificant 
estimates of program impact on participation. Results for PROGRESA, which allows 
ineligible households to be identified in both treatment and control communities, and hence 
estimating indirect program effects, suggest though that the latter are small (Souflas and Di 
Maro, 2008). 
Among the programs studied, eligibility is typically based on baseline household 
characteristics, such as measures of the quality of housing, possession of durables or other 
characteristics. Or when eligibility depends explicitly on income (as in the case of Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia for example), this is normally self-reported and is not typically re-assessed 
over time. This implies that the substitution effect of these programs on labor supply is 
possibly negligible. One interpretation of the small and insignificant program effects found is 
that the income elasticity of leisure among beneficiaries of CCTs is on average close to zero, 
although clearly we cannot rule out offsetting employment effects of other program 
ingredients, including conditionalities, or even biases in program estimates stemming from 
violations of the identification assumptions underlying the consistency of the proposed 
estimators. 
In Table 2B we focus on the contemporaneous effect of non-contributory pensions on 
labor force participation. Because eligibility for these programs typically depends (among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Estimates of program impact that additionally account for household or individual fixed effects (as in Alzúa, 
Cruces and Ripani 2010) also control for potential differential changes in the composition of the evaluation 
sample across treatment and control communities. This is a clearly an advantage relative to studies that ignore 
this dimension, although the inclusion of household or individual fixed effects is unable to account for 
endogenous compositional changes that might lead to biased estimates of program impact. 	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other things) on age, program estimates are usually derived based on double or triple 
differences that exploit changes in age eligibility criteria over time (and area) (see for 
example Carvalho Filho, 2008) or they rely on discontinuities in eligibility by age using a 
regression discontinuity design (Bosch and Popova, 2012).  
As the Brazilian rural pension program is not means tested, the large negative and 
statistically significant effects on participation found in the literature suggest a non-negligible 
negative income elasticity of leisure among the elderly in the region. 
Evidence for other countries is mixed. In Mexico, were several independent non-
contributory programs are in place for adults over 70s there is no clear pattern in the results. 
While Juarez (2009) finds no effect on labor supply of a program implemented in the Distrito 
Federal and Galiani and Getler (2009) find no effect of the program 70 y mas (except what 
appears some substitution away from paid to unpaid family work), early results from a 
randomized program in two cities in Yucatan show significant negative labor supply effects 
among the elderly (Aguila, Kapteyn, Robles and Weidmer, 2011)  
One final consideration is that while the modeling section III is used to understand 
contemporaneous (i.e. static) effects of social assistance on labor supply, it is not appropriate 
to analyze the dynamic incentives of social assistance on labor supply decisions. In particular, 
this model is unable to capture the disincentives to formalize among workers in expectation 
that non-contributory social assistance will serve as a safety net in old age. This is clearly an 
important issue but given the paucity of empirical evidence on this topic we prefer to ignore it 
in the present discussion. The only evidence we are aware of is a recent paper by Attanasio, 
Meghir and Otero (2011) that analyzes the 2008 Chilean Pension reform. They argue that the 
reform decreased participation in the formal labor market by around 0.4% among workers 
older than 40 years of age.  
 
3.b Effects on formality and informality 
 
A number of recent studies analyze the effect of non-contributory social assistance on the 
choice between formal and informal employment. Tables 3A and 3B summarize existing 
evaluations of the impact of conditional cash transfer programs and non-contributory social 
insurance, respectively.  
These studies differ along a number of dimensions. Definitions of informality, for 
example, vary from study to study. This only in part reflects the fact that there is no single 
and unanimous definition of informality in the literature (see Perry, Maloney, Fajnzylber, 
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Mason and Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). Most studies classify workers affiliated with social 
security as formal. For example, Gasparini, Haimovich and Olivieri (2007) for Argentina 
include in this category all workers with a right to a pension while studies of Mexico’s 
Seguro Popular typically classify as formal those with health insurance in their current job. 
There is also some ambiguity as to whether the self-employed should be included among the 
informal, as for example in Azuara and Marinescu (2010), or should not be included, as 
appears to be the case in Camacho, Conover and Hoyos (2010) who use a definition of 
informality that accounts for “employees […] who do not contribute to health insurance 
through employment” (p.4). This raises an additional point which concerns differences across 
studies in the reference population; Some studies focus on share of formal workers over  the 
working age population (as in Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pagés, 2011, Azuara and 
Marinescu, 2010), while other studies focus on the level of total formal employment (as in 
Bosch and Campos-Vasquez, 2010). Results from these studies are not strictly comparable as 
individuals can also be out of employment, implying that formality and informality are not 
exhaustive states of employment. Nor is recommended to restrict to only those individuals in 
employment, that is pursued by some authors (e.g. Barros, 2011), as clearly employment 
itself could possibly be affected by program participation. 
Additional differences pertain to the sources of data. While the majority of studies use 
household survey data, a few studies, notably Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito and Zerpa 
(2011) for Uruguay’s PANES and Bosch and Campos-Vasquez (2010) for Mexico’s Seguro 
Popular, use social security data. One advantage of household survey data is that they 
typically collect sufficient information on individuals’ labor market status to identify all three 
margins of participation (formal employment, informal employment and non-employment). 
One drawback of these data is that these variables are self-reported, and hence potentially 
affected by measurement error. This might lead to estimates of program impact that are 
imprecise or even biased if measurement error is systematic. Although administrative data 
identify workers affiliated with social security with no error, a major drawback is that the 
residual category mixes informal and not-employed individuals. Hence, one cannot 
differentiate whether a fall in formal employment in response to program participation 
corresponds to an increase in informality or in non-employment. 
With these caveats in mind, the most carefully executed and convincing papers are 
summarized in Table 3B. The table shows that, consistent with the model in Section III, non-
contributory insurance schemes tend to boost informal employment at the expense of formal 
employment. This appears to be the case for both Colombia’s Regimen Subsidiado en Salud 
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(Camacho, Conover and Hoyos, 2010) and Mexico’s Seguro Popular (Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pagés, 2011, Bosch and Campos-Vázquez, 2010). As these programs are 
accessible only to those who are not in formal employment, this implies a significant 
substitution effect induced by the eligibility criteria. Note, however, that results on Seguro 
Popular are not completely undisputed. A number of studies using household survey data 
find negligible negative impacts of the Seguro Popular on the share of formal employment 
(Campos-Vázquez and Knox, 2008, Barros, 2011, Azuara and Marinescu, 2010). A possible 
explanation for this is provided by Bosch and Campos-Vázquez, 2010. Using social security 
data they show that the negative effects are mainly found in small firms in relatively small 
municipalities which are grossly underrepresented in household surveys. 
There is also some evidence, summarized in Table 3A, of an effect of CCTs on labor 
market informality. Although (consistent with their results on Seguro Popular) Azuara and 
Marinescu (2010) find no effect of Oportunidades on informal employment, Gasparini, 
Haimovich and Olivieri (2007) find a negative effect of the Plan Jefes y Jefas on the 
transitions out of unemployment and into formal employment. One limitation of this study, 
however, is that program estimates are based on propensity score matching, hence essentially 
attempt to control for non-random program assignment based on observables. Gonzalez-
Rozada and Pinto (2011) also focus on transition rates. Their analysis points to a negative 
effect among beneficiaries of the Ecuadorean BDH on transitions out of unemployment and a 
positive effect of separations from formal employment. To come to this conclusion they use a 
regression discontinuity estimator in an underlying poverty score, itself a function of a set of 
baseline variables. A drawback of their approach, though, is that they do not have 
information on either the poverty score or the variables that determine it at baseline, so they 
estimate a propensity score based on characteristics measured during the treatment period. 
This clearly raises the issue of endogenous behavioral responses that might affect the 
consistency of their program estimates. Another study that uses a regression discontinuity 
estimator in an underlying poverty score is Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito and Zerpa (2011), 
which analyzes the Uruguayan PANES. Their results show a clear negative and large effect of 
program participation on employment in the formal sector. One explanation for such a large 
effect is that PANES, contrary to most programs in the region, enforced strict income 
conditionalities leading to a strong substitution effect away from formal employment. 
 
 
	  
	  
15	  
4. Lessons learnt and recommendations 
In this paper we have documented the rapid spread of non-contributory social assistance 
programs in the region over the last ten to fifteen years and provided a classification of these 
programs and a summary of their main features. We have used this information together with 
the implications of a simple theoretical model of labor supply to summarize and critically 
review the existing evidence on the causal effects of social assistance on participation, 
employment, hours of work and informality in the region. A comparison across studies helps 
identify some common trends, although this task is complicated not only by differences 
across studies in the programs under study but also the type of data, the identification 
strategies and the definitions of formal and informal employment used. 
The results of this review can be tentatively summarized as follows: 
1. There is little evidence that conditional cash transfer programs reduce adult labor 
supply at both the intensive and the extensive margin. One reason why this might be 
the case is that, with few exceptions, these programs are not income tested and, if they 
are, testing tends not to be enforced. Low income elasticity of leisure among the poor 
and very poor is likely to explain the lack of significant effects found. 
2. There is evidence of negative labor supply effects of social pensions among the 
elderly, which is potentially attributable to non-negligible income elasticity of leisure 
in this population. 
3. We find clear evidence of subsidized insurance schemes increasing the share of 
informal workers and reducing the share of formal workers in the labor force. As the 
schemes analyzed exclude formal workers, this is consistent with such schemes 
creating an incentive towards informality through a substitution effect. 
4. We also find evidence that some conditional cash transfer programs appear to reduce 
the fraction of formal workers in the population, although this seems to be particularly 
true among the few programs that enforce income means testing. 
Some lessons emerge for future research. This is particularly important if the aim is to 
accumulate comparable knowledge across countries and programs in order to guide the policy 
discussion. 
1. Program description must be as accurate as possible in order to identify all different 
channels behind the estimated effects. Particular attention will need to be paid to the 
criteria used to acquire and, if applicable, to maintain eligibility (i.e. means testing or 
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proxy-means testing). The discussion will need to include both program rules and 
actual implementation. 
2. It is of paramount importance that the definition of informality is made clear at the 
outset and that it is consistent with the most widely used definitions in the literature. If 
possible, multiple definitions of informality should be used. This is relevant as social 
policies might themselves make the definitions of informality fuzzier. For instance, 
access to health insurance has been traditionally used to separate formal and informal 
workers in Mexico. With the appearance of non-contributory schemes (like Seguro 
Popular), it is participation to the contributory system that defines formality not 
access to health care services per se.  
3. It is equally important that all margins of participation: formal employment, informal 
employment and non-employment (the latter possibly split into unemployment and 
inactivity) are analyzed if the data allow. 
4. In all cases, researchers will have to make sufficiently clear whether their samples 
refer to the population, the labor force, or the employed; although in the latter case 
appropriate attention should be paid to potential endogenous employment responses. 
5. Investigations of effects on hours of work must necessarily take into account margins 
of endogenous selection and compositional effects. These seem largely ignored in the 
literature. 
When possible and reasonable, researchers must focus on levels before modeling transition 
rates.
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 Table 1A – List of non-contributory social programs in LAC – Conditional Cash Transfers 
 
Country Policy Name (Year 
Started) 
Beneficiaries Targeting Mechanism Conditions Cost as % 
of GDP 
Transfers to the 
poorest quintile 
as % of their 
income (2010) 
Argentina Programa Familias 
(2002) 
Poor women and mothers without the 
capacity to work, and households with 
beneficiary members of Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar Desocupados, with at least two 
children and household head with 
incomplete secondary school 
Categorical targeting Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
 0.14% 2007 44.3% 
Argentina Plan Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar Desocupados 
(2001) 
Unemployed household heads with at least 
one dependent under 18. pregnant women, 
and disabled children 
Categorical targeting plus 
unemployment test 
Job training or community 
work 
1% 2003   
Argentina Asignación Familiar 
por Hijo (2009) 
Children under 18 years of age, who belong 
to a household with an unemployed or 
informally employed head, whose income is 
less than the minimum wage 
Categorical targeting plus 
means testing 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.08% 2009   
Bolivia Bono Juancito Pinto 
(2006) 
Households with children in public school 
up to eighth grade 
Categorical targeting School attendance 0.2% 2008 4.7% 
Bolivia Bono Madre Niño and 
Bono Juana Azurduy 
de Padilla (2009) 
Women and their households without 
medical insurance or access to the 
breastfeeding grant, nationwide in 327 
municipalities 
 
Categorical targeting Health check-ups 0.22% 2009   
Brazil Bolsa Família (2003) Extremely poor households - with PCI up to 
$60 (1/4 minimum wage) - and poor 
families - with PCI of R$60 to R$120. in 
targeted municipalities 
Categorical targeting plus 
means testing 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.3% 2008 18.0% 
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Country Policy Name (Year 
Started) 
Beneficiaries Targeting Mechanism Conditions Cost as % 
of GDP 
Transfers to the 
poorest quintile 
as % of their 
income (2010) 
Chile Subsidio Unitario 
Familiar (1981) 
Poor households in the bottom 40% of the 
income distribution, as measured by proxy-
means test, with pregnant women, school-
age children or disabled members 
Proxy-means testing Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.09% 1998   
Chile Chile Solidario (2002) Households in extreme poverty Proxy-means testing (Ficha 
CAS) 
Health check-ups, school 
attendance,	  employment	  and	  additional	  participation	  in	  personal	  assistance	  programs	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  housing,	  income,	  family	  life,	  and	  legal	  documentation. 
0.1% 2005   
Colombia Familias en Acción 
(2002) 
Extremely poor households in selected 
municipalities, with children aged 0-6 who 
are not benefitting from other programs, or 
aged 7-17 enrolled in school 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing (Sistema 
de Identificación de 
Beneficiarios - SISBEN) 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
  30.4% 
Costa Rica Avancemos (2006) Children aged 0–14 and pregnant women in 
extreme poverty 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing (Sistema 
de Información de la Población 
Objetivo - SIPO) 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.02% 2005   
Dominican 
Republic 
Solidaridad (2005) Household within priority areas in moderate 
to extreme poverty, with children aged 0-5 
for health services, 6-16 for school 
attendance 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing (SIUBEN) 
Health check-ups, school 
attendance and training 
0.34% 2006 13.4% 
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (2003) 
Households with children aged 0–16 in the 
poorest 2 quintiles and poor households 
with elderly and/or disabled members 
Proxy-means testing (Sistema 
de Identificacion y Selección de 
Beneficiarios de Programas 
Sociales - SELBEN) 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
 0.7I% 2008 30.8% 
El Salvador Red Solidaria (2005) Extremely poor rural households with 
children aged 0–15 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing 
Health check-ups, school 
attendance and training 
sessions. Transfer must be 
spent on food 
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Country Policy Name (Year 
Started) 
Beneficiaries Targeting Mechanism Conditions Cost as % 
of GDP 
Transfers to the 
poorest quintile 
as % of their 
income (2010) 
Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa 
(2008) 
Extremely poor households with children 
aged 0–15, living in the 130 most 
vulnerable municipalities 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.06% 2008 24.9% 
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación Familiar 
(1998) 
Poor households with children aged 6–12 
who have not completed grade 4 of primary 
school (education), and poor households 
with pregnant women and/or children less 
than 3 years old (health) 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing 
Random assignment across 
municipalities  
 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.3% 2005   
Jamaica Program of 
Advancement through 
Health and Education 
(2001) 
Children aged 0-19 (or until they graduate 
from secondary school); poor people aged 
60 and older; pregnant or lactating women 
up to 6 months after delivery; people with 
disabilities; poor adults - within the selected 
vulnerable groups (not just those below the 
poverty line) 
Proxy-means testing Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.32% 2010   
Mexico Oportunidades 
(formerly 
PROGRESA) (1997) 
Extremely poor households with children 
younger than 21 enrolled in school between 
the third grade of primary and the third 
grade of high school (education), and with 
children aged 4 months-2 years, 
malnourished children aged 2-4. and 
pregnant and lactating women (health)  
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing  
(Random assignment across 
municipalities) 
Health check-ups, school 
attendance, and education 
0.32% 2009 45.1% 
Mexico Programa de Apoyo 
Alimentario (2009) 
Households with children below 5 years of 
age or lactating women, living in targeted 
rural localities of up to 2,500 inhabitants 
which suffer from high-very high 
deprivation, and who do not receive support 
from other federal programs with a 
nutritional component 
Geographic and categorical 
targeting  
Random assignment across 
communities  
Education     
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social (2000, now 
stopped) 
Poor households with children aged 7–13 
enrolled in primary school grades 1–4 
(education), or aged 0-5 (health)  
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing  
Random assignment across 
municipalities  
Health check-ups, school 
attendance and education 
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Country Policy Name (Year 
Started) 
Beneficiaries Targeting Mechanism Conditions Cost as % 
of GDP 
Transfers to the 
poorest quintile 
as % of their 
income (2010) 
Panama Red de Oportunidades 
(2006) 
Households living in extreme poverty - as 
identified by proxy-means testing - with 
children aged 4-17 attending school 
(education), and pregnant women or 
children less than 5 years of age (health) 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing 
 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
    
Paraguay Tekoporã/PROPAIS II 
(2005) 
Extremely and moderately poor households 
with children aged 0–14 and pregnant 
women, in rural areas only 
Geographic targeting plus 
proxy-means testing (Índice de 
Calidad de Vida - ICV) 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.08% 2007   
Peru Juntos (2005) Poor households with children aged 0-14 Geographic targeting, Sistema 
de Focalización de Hogares - 
SISFOH) 
Health check-ups, school 
attendance, and education 
0.1% 2006 25.3% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Target Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
Programme (2006) 
Poor households Proxy-means testing Training and job search     
Uruguay Asignación Familiar 
(formerly Plan de 
Atención Nacional a 
la Emergencia Social 
- PANES) (2008) 
The poorest 20% of households among 
those below the national poverty line, with 
children aged 0-18 
Proxy-means testing (Índice de 
Carencias Críticas - ICC) 
Health check-ups and 
school attendance 
0.41% until 
2010 
26.7% 
 
Notes: The table summarizes all CCT programs instituted in the region (as defined by the Inter-American Bank’s borrowing member countries) since Chile’s Subsidio 
Unitario Familiar in 1981, and which remain active today, albeit in some cases under a different name or with alterations in program design. Sources: All information comes 
from Barrientos, Nino-Zarazua and Maitrot (2010) except for the following notable exceptions: Chile Solidario: Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Bono de Desarrollo Humano: 
Gonzalez-Rozada and Pinto (2011); Mi Familia Progresa: Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Programa de Asignación Familiar: Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Oportunidades: 
Parker and Skoufias (2000); Programa de Apoyo Alimentario: Skoufias et al. (2008); Red de Protección Social: Maluccio (2007) and Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Red de 
Oportunidades: Arráiz and Rozo (2010); Target Conditional Cash Transfer Programme: Hailu and Pemberton (2007); Asignación Familiar: Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito 
and Zerpa (2011); transfers to the poorest quintile as % of their income (2010): Robles (2011). 
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Table 1B – List of non-contributory social programs in LAC – Non-contributory Pensions 
 
  
Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average 
Monthly Benefit 
US$ 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Minimum 
Wage 
Argentina Pensiones 
Asistenciales 
(2004) 
Universal restricted Individuals above 70 years of 
age, living in towns of up to 
30,000 inhabitants, who are 
not beneficiaries of Desarrollo 
Humano Oportunidades 
Geographic 
targeting 
 0.23% 
2010 
96 2010     
Bahamas Old Age Non-
contributory 
Pension (1956) 
Targeted Individuals above 65 years of 
age, assessed as being needy 
based on the Test-of-
Resources, who do not meet 
contribution conditions for 
Retirement Benefit 
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements  
  230 2010     
Barbados Non-
contributory Old 
Age Pension 
(1937) 
Targeted Individuals over 65 years and 
6 months of age, who do not 
receive any other government 
pension or insurance 
Means tested   262 2010     
Belize Non 
Contributory 
Pension 
Program (2003) 
Targeted Poor men and women aged 
above 67 and 65 respectively 
Means tested 0.18% 
2010 
51     
Bolivia Renta Dignidad 
(1997 as 
Bonosol) 
Universal Individuals above 60 years of 
age, with two different benefit 
levels for individuals 
receiving no government 
pension/income, and for those 
receiving some sort of 
government income 
Universal. Level of 
benefits depends on 
income 
1.7% 2008 29 (22 for 
individuals with 
other government 
income)2009 
5.71%2003-6 30.8% 2003-6 
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Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Minimum 
Wage 
Bolivia Pensión Mínima 
(2007) 
Complementary Individuals above 60 years of 
age who have contributed to the 
Sistema Social Obligatorio or 
the Sistema de Reparto for at 
least 180 periods, and have a 
pension lower than the 
minimum wage 
Means tested 
plus contribution 
requirements 
1.09% 
2010 
97.08 2010   100% 
Brazil Benefício de 
Prestação 
Continuada 
(1974 as Renda 
Mensal Vitalicia 
- RMV) 
Targeted Poor individuals - with per 
household income below 1/4 
minimum wage - above 65 
years of age, with family 
members receiving no social 
security benefit or 
unemployment insurance 
 
Means tested  0.45% 
2007 
112.93 2002-6 35.72% 2002-6 100% 
Brazil Previdência 
Rural (1991) 
Targeted Individuals in rural areas above 
60 (men) or 55 years of age 
(women), without any 
documented work/contribution 
history  
Categorical 
targeting 
1.5% 2008       
Chile Pensión Mínima 
Garantizada por 
el Estado 
Complementary 
 
Men and women above 65 and 
60 years of age, respectively, 
with a total income below 11.14 
minimum wages, who have 
contributed for at least 20 years 
Means tested 
plus contribution 
requirements 
0.54% 
2006 
116 2002-6  22.48% 2002-6  51.81% 2002-6 
Chile Sistema de 
Pensiones 
Solidarias (1975 
as Pensiones 
Asistenciales - 
PASIS) 
Targeted Individuals above 65 years of 
age or disabled aged 18 and 
over, belonging to the poorest 
60% of the population (from 
July 2011) 
Means tested 0.9% 2009 118 2009   
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Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Minimum 
Wage 
Colombia La Garantía de 
Pensión Mínima 
(1993) 
Complementary Men and women above 62 
and 57 years of age 
respectively, who have 
contributed for at least 1,150 
weeks without reaching the 
minimum legislated pension, 
and disabled individuals 
counting with at least 26 
weeks of contributions 
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements 
  156 2002-6 63.37% 2002-
6 
100% 
Colombia El Programa de 
Subsidio de 
Aporte a Pensión 
(1993) 
Complementary Men and women earning a 
maximum of 1 minimum 
wage, above 55 and 65 years 
of age, respectively, if 
covered by Social Security, or 
above 58 years of age if 
covered by RAI but with 
insufficient funds to finance a 
minimum pension, and must 
have health coverage under 
the General System of Social 
Security 
Means tested 0.029% 
2006 
14 2003-6 5.84% 2003-6 9.22% 2003-6 
Colombia El Programa de 
Protección 
Social al Adulto 
Mayor (2003) 
Targeted Individuals aged at least 3 
years less than the minimum 
pension age for affiliates of 
the General Pension System, 
who are living in moderate or 
extreme poverty 
 
Proxy-means 
tested (SISBEN) 
 0.019% 
2003 
22 2003-6 8.93% 2003-6 14.09% 2003-6 
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Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Minimum 
Wage 
Costa Rica Régimen No 
Contributivo 
(1974) 
Targeted Poor individuals above 65 
years of age, the disabled and 
unable to work aged 18-64. 
orphans under age 18, widows 
between 55 and 65 in poverty, 
or with children under the age 
18 or 21 if students or 
unemployed; youngsters 
between age 18 and 21 who 
are studying or unemployed; 
homeless people who meet 
the requirements 
Means-tested 0.01% 
2006 
43 2002-6 7.67% 2002-6 13.83% 2002-6 
Costa Rica Pensión Mínima 
(2005) 
Complementary Poor individuals above 65 
years of age with 20 years of 
contributions or 240 monthly 
contributions  
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements 
0.21% 
2006 
99 2002-6 21.55% 2002-
6 
38.89% 2002-6 
Dominican 
Republic 
Programa 
Nonagenarios 
(1985) 
  
Targeted Poor individuals above 60 
years of age 
Means tested   43 2010     
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Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as % 
of Minimum 
Wage 
Dominican 
Republic 
Pensión Mínima 
Garantizada 
(2001) 
Complementary Low-income individuals 
above 65 years of age, with 
low incomes, who have 
contributed for at least 300 
months 
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements 
      70 - 100% 
Dominican 
Republic 
Pensión 
Solidaria del 
Régimen 
Subsidiado (not 
yet active) 
Targeted Individuals above 65 years of 
age with insufficient 
resources to satisfy their basic 
needs, severely disabled 
people of any age, or 
unemployed single mothers 
unable to afford the basic 
needs and education of their 
children 
Categorical 
targeting plus 
means testing 
     60% 
El Salvador Pensión Mínima 
(1996) 
Complementary Men and women over 60 and 
55 years of age, respectively, 
who have completed a 
minimum of 25 years of 
contributions without 
reaching the minimum 
pension level, and whose 
income is less than the 
minimum wage 
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements 
        
El Salvador Pensiones 
Asistenciales 
(2009) 
Universal restricted Individuals above 70 years of 
age in the 100 municipalities 
with the highest poverty 
incidence in the country 
Geographic 
targeting 
  50 2009   
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Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Minimum 
Wage 
Mexico Pensión Mínima 
Garantizada 
(1997) 
Complementary Individuals who have contributed 
to Social Security for at least 
1,250 weeks or 24 years but have 
not accumulated sufficient 
resources for a pension 
Means tested plus 
contribution 
requirements 
  128 2009   100% 
Mexico Programa de 
Atención a los 
Adultos Mayores 
en Zonas 
Rurales (2003) 
Targeted Individuals above 60 years of 
age living in conditions of 
malnutrition in rural localities 
with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants 
and very high marginalization, 
and who do not receive support 
from other programs 
Geographic targeting   13.58 2009     
Mexico Pensión 
Alimentaria para 
Adultos Mayores 
(2001) 
Universal restricted People above 70 years of age 
with at least 3 years of residence 
in the part of Mexico city that 
belongs to the Distrito Federal 
(DF) state 
Geographic targeting 0..04% 
2010 
66 2010     
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Notes: The table summarizes all non-contributory pension programs instituted in the region (as defined by the Inter-American Bank’s borrowing member countries), which 
remain active today, albeit in some cases under a different name or with alterations in program design. Source: Barrientos, Nino-Zarazua and Maitrot (2010), FIAP (2011) 
and Pension watch (2011) Cost as % GDP and Average Monthly Benefit in US$ from Pension watch (2011) for the following programs: Pensiones Asistenciales (Argentina); 
Old Age Non-contributory Pension (Bahamas); Non-contributory Old Age Pension (Barbados); Non Contributory Pension Program (Belize); Pensión Mínima (Bolivia); 
Pensiones Asistenciales (El Salvador); Pension Alimentaria para Adultos Mayores (Mexico). Policy and beneficiary information from SSA (2010) for the following 
programs: Old Age Non-contributory Pension (Bahamas); Non-contributory Old Age Pension (Barbados); Non Contributory Pension Program (Belize); Means-tested Old-
age pension (Trinidad and Tobago), and from Schwarzer and Querino (2002) for both Brazilian programs.   
Country Policy Name Policy type Beneficiaries Targeting 
Mechanism 
Cost as 
% of 
GDP 
Average Monthly 
Benefit US$ 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Average 
Salary 
Average 
Benefit as 
% of 
Minimum 
Wage 
Mexico 70 y más (2007) Universal restricted Individuals above 70 years of 
age, living in towns of up to 
30,000 inhabitants (increased 
from the earlier limits of 
localities of up to 20,000 
inhabitants in 2008 and rural 
localities of up 2,500 inhabitants 
in 2007) who are not 
beneficiaries of recipients of the 
Elderly Support program of the 
Oportunidades Program 
Geographic targeting 0.11% 
2010 
40 2009   
Panama 100 a los 70 
(2009) 
Targeted Individuals above 70 years of 
age who do not receive a pension 
Means tested   100     
Peru Pensión Mínima 
(2002) 
Complementary Individuals above 65 years of 
age, born after 1945, with at least 
20 years of contributions to 
either the Private or the National 
Pension System 
Contribution 
requirements 
  167 2009     
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Means-tested 
Old-age pension 
(1939) 
Targeted Poor individuals over 65 years of 
age 
Means tested   396     
Uruguay Programa de 
Pensiones No-
Contributivas 
(1995) 
Targeted Individuals people above 70 
years of age who are excluded 
from formal social insurance 
Means tested   92 2002-6 19.5% 2002-6 103.38% 2002-
6 
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Table 1C – List of non-contributory social program in LAC - Selected non-contributory health insurance schemes 
 
Country Policy Name Beneficiaries 
Colombia Régimen Subsidiado 
en Salud 
Poor individuals - as identified by poverty index score - not covered by the 
Contributive Regime (CR) 
Mexico Programa de 
Servicios Médicos y 
Medicamentos 
Gratuitos 
(PSMMG) 
Individuals over 18 years old (legal working age in Mexico), with at least 3 years 
of residence in part of Mexico city belonging to Distrito Federal, who are 
uncovered by other health insurance 
Mexico Seguro Popular Individuals not covered by social security. Extends to household and not only to 
nuclear family 
 
Notes: The table summarizes selected non-contributory health insurance schemes in the region. Sources: Régimen Subsidiado en Salud - Camacho, Conover and Hoyos 
(2010); Programa de Servicios Médicos y Medicamentos Gratuitos - Juárez (2011); Seguro Popular - Bosch and Campos-Vázquez (2010). 
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Table 2A – Impact evaluation of non-contributory social program on participation/hours– Conditional Cash Transfers 
    
Country Program Source Data (time 
period) 
Identification strategy Effect on Employment/ 
participation  
Effect on hours 
Argentina Plan Jefes y Jefas 
de Hogar 
Desocupados 
Galasso and 
Ravallion 
(2004) 
EPH (2001-
02) 
 
D among successful/unsuccessful 
applicants with matching (+ DD 
over time) 
No effect on employment Negative effect on hours of work 
Brazil Bolsa Familia Foguel and 
Paes de 
Barros (2010) 
PNAD 
(2001-05) 
 
DD by municipality and time Small positive effect on 
participation (significant 
only for men) 
Small insignificant effects on 
hours of work  
Colombia Familias en 
Acción 
Attanasio and 
Gómez (2004) 
(2002-03) 
 
DD by municipality and time  Positive effect on 
participation (for men in 
rural areas and women in 
urban areas) 
Positive effect on hours of work 
(for men in rural areas and 
women in urban areas) 
Honduras Programa de 
Asignación 
Familiar 
Alzua, Cruces 
and Ripani 
(2010) 
(2000-02) DD by municipality and time (with 
individual/household fixed effects) 
Small insignificant negative 
effect on employment 
Small positive insignificant 
(among those with positive hours) 
Mexico PROGRESA Alzua, Cruces 
and Ripani 
(2010) 
ENCEL 
(1997-99) 
 
DD by municipality and time, 
eligible households only (with 
individual/household fixed effects) 
Small insignificant negative 
effect on employment 
No effect (among those with 
positive hours) 
 
 
Mexico PROGRESA Parker and 
Skoufias 
(2000) 
ENCEL 
(1997-99) 
 
DD by municipality and time No effect  
Mexico PROGRESA Skoufias and 
Di Maro 
(2008) 
ENCEL 
(1997-99) 
 
DD by municipality and time Small insignificant negative 
effect 
 
Mexico Programa de 
Apoyo 
Alimentario  
Skoufias, 
Unar and 
González-
Cossí (2008) 
(2003-05) DD by municipality and time No effect on participation  
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social 
Alzua, Cruces 
and Ripani 
(2010) 
(2000-01) DD by municipality and time (with 
individual/household fixed effects) 
Small insignificant negative 
effect on employment 
Negative but insignificant (among 
those with positive hours) 
 
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social 
Maluccio 
(2007) 
(2001-04) 
 
D by municipality (with household 
random effects) 
Negative significant effect  
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Table 2B – Impact evaluation of non-contributory social program on participation/hours – Non-contributory Pensions 
 
Country Program Source Data (time 
period) 
Identification strategy Effect on employment/ 
participation 
Brazil Previdência Rural  de Carvalho 
Filho (2008) 
 DDD by age, time, 
occupation/location 
Negative significant effect 
on participation for men 
Brazil Previdência Rural Bosch and 
Popova 
(2012) 
1980-2000 RD, age eligibility Negative significant effect 
on participation for both 
men and women 
Mexico Experimental 
Program in 
Yucatan 
Aguila et 
al.(2011) 
2009-2010 
(6 months 
treatment) 
Experimental Large effects on 
participation 
Mexico 70 y más Galiani and 
Gerlter (2009) 
(2007-08) DD by age/ municipality and time No effect on employment 
(substitution away from paid 
to unpaid family work) 
Mexico Pension 
Alimentaria para 
Adultos Mayores  
Juárez (2007) ENEU 
(2002-04) 
DDD by age, municipality and 
time 
No effect on participation 
(but some negative effects 
among participants’ 
household members) 
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Table 3A – Impact evaluation of non-contributory social program on informality – Conditional cash Transfers 
 
Country Program Source Data (time 
period) 
Identification strategy Effect on 
informality 
Definition of 
formal 
employment 
Argentina Plan Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar desocupados 
Gasparini, 
Haimovich and 
Olivieri (2007) 
EPH (2003-
2005) 
 
D with PS matching Negative significant 
effect on (transition 
into) formal 
employment 
Employees with 
right to pension 
 
Ecuador Bono de Desarollo 
Humano 
Gonzalez-Rozada 
and Pinto (2011) 
ENEMDU 
(2004-10) 
 
RD on predicted SELBEN index Positive significant 
effect on duration of 
unemployment and 
separation from 
formal employment 
 
Mexico Oportunidades Azuara and 
Marinescu (2010) 
ENE (1994-04) 
ENOE (2005-
09) 
 
DD by municipality and time No effect on 
informal 
employment  
(unclear if 
conditional or not on 
employment) 
Employees in job 
providing health 
insurance 
Uruguay Plan de Atención 
Nacional a la 
Emergencia Social 
Amarante, 
Manacorda, 
Vigorito and 
Zerpa (2011) 
BPS data 
(2004-10) 
 
RD based on poverty score 
(with individual fixed effect) 
Negative significant 
effect on formal 
employment  
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Table 3B – Impact evaluation of non-contributory social program on informality– Selected Non-contributory Health insurance Schemes 
 
Country Program Source Data (time period) Identification strategy Effect of 
informality 
Definition of formal 
employment 
Colombia Regimen Subsidiado 
en Salud 
Camacho, 
Conover and 
Hoyos (2010) 
(1986-05) DD(D) by municipality and 
time (and eligibility for SR) 
 
RD 
Positive significant 
effect on informal 
employment  
In job providing health  
Mexico Seguro Popular Aterido, 
Hallward-
Driemeier and 
Pagés (2011) 
ENE (2002-04) 
ENOE (2004-09) 
 
DD by municipality and time 
(with individual/household 
fixed effects) 
 
Positive significant 
effect on informal 
employment  
In job providing health 
insurance 
Mexico Seguro Popular Azuara and 
Marinescu 
(2010) 
ENE (1994- 04) 
ENOE (2005-09) 
 
DD by municipality and time No effect on 
informality (other 
than for positive 
effect among 
specific groups e.g. 
low education)  
(Unclear if 
conditional or not on 
employment) 
In job providing health 
insurance 
Mexico	   Seguro Popular Bosch and 
Campos-
Vasquez (2010) 
IMS data, 2002-09 
 
DD by municipality and time Negative significant 
effect on formal 
employment, 
(especially in small 
and medium size 
firms) 
Contributing to social 
security in current job 
Mexico	   Seguro Popular Barros (2011) ENSA (2000) 
ENSANUT (2006) 
ENIGH (2000-06) 
 
DD(D) by state, time (and SS 
affiliation) 
Positive 
insignificant effect 
on formal 
employment 
(conditional on 
employment)  
In job providing health 
insurance 
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Country Program Source Data (time period) Identification strategy Effect of 
informality 
Definition of formal 
employment 
Mexico	   Seguro Popular Campos-
Vasquez and 
Knox (2008) 
ENE (2002-04) 
 
DD by municipality and time No effect on 
informality 
In job providing health 
insurance 
Mexico	   Seguro Popular Duval- 
Hernández and 
Smith-Ramírez 
(2011) 
ENE (2002-04), 
ENOE (2004-09) 
 
DD by state and time Negative significant 
effect on probability 
of applying for 
formal job 
In job providing health 
insurance 
Mexico	   Programa de 
Servicios Médicos y 
Medicamentos 
Gratuitos (PSMMG) 
Juárez (2011) ENEU (2001-04) DD across municipalities and 
time 
Positive significant 
effect (low 
education women) 
In job providing social 
security coverage  
Notes. Includes all programs in the region except a few Non-contributory Pensions introduced in the Caribbean between 1937 and the 1970s. 
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Figure 1: The spread of non-contributory programs in LAC – Numner of CCTs 
Figure 2: The spread of non-contributory programs in LAC – Social pension schemes 
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Figure 3. The distribution of workers among sectors - Stone Geary utility function 
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Figure 4. The distribution of workers among sectors following a rise in the generosity of 
means-tested non-contributory social assistance - Stone Geary utility function 
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Figure 5. The distribution of workers among sectors following a rise in the generosity of 
means-tested non-contributory social assistance - linear utility function 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Stone Geary utility function  
 
U(formal)=ln(Y+WF)+ln(b)   
U(informal)=ln(Y+WI+G) 
U(non-employed)=ln(Y+G)+ln(a)  
 
where b>1 is the workers’ marginal valuation of formal benefits and a>1 the marginal utility 
of leisure. In equilibrium (see Figure 3) individuals will chose formal employment if:  
 
b>(Y+WI+G)/(Y+WF)=k1        (A1) 
b>a(Y+G)/(Y+WF) =a k2        (A2)  
 
Individuals will choose informal employment if:  
 
b<(Y+WI+G)/(Y+WF)=k1   
a<(Y+WI+G)/(Y+G)=k3         (A3) 
 
The conditions that determine inactivity are defined residually. As long as WI>WF, (which 
seems reasonable, otherwise, assuming b>1, nobody will be in informal work), a rise in G 
will leads to a rise in k1 and k2 and a fall in k3. The new equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
A2. Linear utility function  
 
U(formal)= Y+WF+B   
U(informal)= Y+WI+G 
U(non-employed)= Y+ G+A  
 
In equilibrium, individuals will chose formal employment if:  
 
B>WI-WF+G=l1         (A4) 
B> A-WI +G=l2         (A5) 
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Individuals will chose informal employment if:  
 
B< WI-WF+G=l1   
A<WI=l3            (A6) 
 
A rise in G will lead to a rise in l1 and l2. The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5. The share 
of formal workers in both the working age and employed population falls. 
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